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TORTS-LOSS OF CONSORTIUM-CHILDREN DO NOT 
HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LOSS OF PARENTAL 
CONSORTIUM WHEN A PARENT SURVIVES A TORTIOUS 
INJURY. Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 557 A.2d 210 (1989). 
The common law did not permit a child to recover damages for 
the loss of parental consortium I cause!i by the negligence of a third 
party.2 This is still the majority view of the courts. 3 The majority of 
1. Courts have provided a variety of definitions of parental consortium. These 
definitions include a parent's "love, companionship, affection, society, comfort, 
services and solace,"Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 14,303 N.W.2d 424,426 
(1981), "love, care, companionship and guidance," Ueland v. Reynolds Metals 
Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 132 n.l, 691 P.2d 190, 191 n.l (1984) (en bane) 
(citation omitted), and a parent's "society and companionship," Theama v. 
City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 522, 344 N.W.2d 513, 522 (1984). 
2. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143. Blackstone explained the common law 
view of loss of consortium as follows: 
Id. 
We may observe that in these relative injuries, notice is only taken 
of the wrong done to the superior of the parties related, by the breach 
and dissolution of either the relation itself, or at least the advantages 
accruing therefrom; while the loss of the inferior by such injuries is 
totally unregarded. One reason for which may be this: that the inferior 
hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the 
superior, as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior; and 
therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury. The wife cannot 
recover damages for beating her husband, for she hath no separate 
interest in any thing during her coverture. The child hath no property 
in his father or guardian; as they have in him, for the sake of giving 
him education and nurture. 
3. DeLoach v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, 782 F.2d 438 (3d Cir. 
1986) (maritime law); Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 
471 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478 
(D. Neb. 1980) (Nebraska law); Gray v. Suggs, 292 Ark. 19, 728 S.W.2d 148 
(1987); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 
Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977); Lee v.· Colorado Dep't of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 
1986); Zorzos v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1985); Halberg v. Young, 41 
Haw. 634 (1957); Van de Veire v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 178 Ill. App. 3d 
794, 533 N.E.2d 994 (1989); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 
(1962); McFarland v. Cathy, 349 So. 2d 486 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Durepo v. 
Fishman, 533 A.2d 264 (Me. 1987); Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736 
(Minn. 1982); Bradford v. Union Elec. Co., 598 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1979); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); Russell 
v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972); De Angelis v. 
Lutheran Medical Center, 58 N.Y.2d 1053,449 N.E.2d 406, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626 
(1983); Vaughn v. Clarkson, 324 N.C. 108, 376 S.E.2d 236 (1989); Morgel v. 
Winger, 290 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1980); Sanders v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 21 Ohio 
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commentators, however, favor recognition of loss of parental con-
sortium,4 and some courts have recently recognized it. 5 In Gaver v. 
Harrant,6 the father of two minor children was severely injured while 
helping his neighbor with a construction project. 7 He, his wife and 
their children sued the neighbor in the Circuit Court for Frederick 
County.8 One of the counts in their complaint was a claim by the 
children for the loss of consortium of their father. 9 
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the 
children's parental consortium claim on the ground that the claim 
was not recognized in Maryland, and the plaintiffs appealed.1O Prior 
to review of the case by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
App. 3d 249, 487 N.E.2d 588 (1985); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity 
Hosp., 293 Or. 543, 652 P.2d 318 (1982); Steiner v. Bell Tel. Co., 358 Pa. 
Super. 505, 517 A.2d 1348 (1986), aff'd per curiam, 518 Pa. 57, 540 A.2d 266 
(1988); Still v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 755 S.W.2d 807 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). 
4. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 896-97 (4th ed. 1971); 2 s. SPEISER, 
C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 8:23, at 590-96 (1985); 
Love, Tortious Interference With the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an 
Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590 (1976); Note, 
The Child's Right to Sue for Loss of a Parent's Love, Care and Companionship 
Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U.L. REV. 722 (1976); Comment, 
A Minor Child's Claim for Lost Parental Society and Companionship in 
Illinois: Another Look, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 113 (1984); Comment, Loss 
of Parental Consortium: Why Children Should be Compensated, 18 PAC. L.J. 
233 (1986); Comment, The Child's Claim for Loss of Consortium Damages: 
A Logical and Sympathetic Appeal, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 231 (1975); 
Comment, The Child's Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium, 5 SAN FERN. 
V.L. REV. 449 (1977); Comment, Compensating the Child's Loss of Parental 
Love, Care, and Affection, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 293 (1983); Note, Expanding 
Loss of Consortium in Vermont: Developing a New Doctrine, 12 VT. L. REV. 
157 (1987); Note, Child's R{ght to Sue for Negligent Disruption of Parental 
Consortium, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 78 (1982). But see Note, Recovery for Loss 
of Parental Consortium: An Undue Extension of Liability, 43 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 285 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Recovery for Loss of Parental Consortium]. 
5. Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1987); Villareal 
v. State Dep't of Transp., 160 Ariz. 474, 774 P.2d 213 (1989); Weitl v. Moes, 
311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981) (en bane); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, 
Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 
303 N.W.2d 424 (1981); Hay v. Medical Center Hosp., 145 Vt. 533, 496 A.2d 
939 (1985); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 691 P.2d 190 
(1984) (en bane); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 
513 (1984). 
6. 316 Md. 17, 557 A.2d 210 (1989). 
7. Id. at 18, 557 A.2d at 21l. A 2,400-pound post and beam structure collapsed 
on the father resulting in permanent injuries to his back, body, and limbs. He 
cannot work and will suffer pain indefinitely. Id. 
8.Id. 
9. Id. The other counts in the complaint were negligence, strict liability, gross 
negligence, and loss of spousal consortium. Id. 
IO.Id. 
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the court of appeals granted certiorari!! to consider the case, which 
was one of first impression in Maryland. In a 6-1 decision,!2 the 
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and held that a 
child does not have a cause of action for loss of parental consortium 
when a parent survives a tortious injury. 13 
Legal recognition of loss of consortium resulted from the com-
mon law view that the master-servant relationship was analogous to 
the husband-wife relationship.!4 A master had a proprietary interest 
in his servant, who, in the view of the common law, was his master's 
chattelY A third party who tortiously injured a servant was liable 
to the master for the loss of the servant's services resulting from the 
servant's injury.!6 Based on an analogy to the master-servant rela-
tionship, a husband was deemed to have a proprietary interest in his 
wife!7 and could recover damages from a tortfeasor who inflicted an 
injury upon his wife that interfered with the delivery of her services 
to her husband.!S Gradually, the husband's action for loss of his 
wife's services was expanded, and he was permitted to recover 
damages for loss of her affection, society, and companionship, as 
well.!9 A father also had a proprietary interest in his children's 
services, and the loss of their services that resulted from tortious 
injuries inflicted upon them by a third party was actionable by the 
father. 20 A wife, however, had no proprietary interest in her husband, 
so she had no legal redress for the loss of her husband's services, 
affection, society, or companionship, nor could a child bring an 
action for the loss of his or her father's services.2! 
11. Gaver v. Harrant, 313 Md. 49, 542 A.2d 1266 (1988). 
12. Gaver, 316 Md. at 33, 557 A.2d at 218 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
13. Id. 
14. Love, supra note 4, at 599-600; Note, Recovery for Loss of Parental Consor-
tium, supra note 4; at 286. 
15. See Comment, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 653 
(1930). 
16. Comment, A Minor Child's Claim for Lost Parental Society and Companion-
ship in Illinois: Another Look, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 113, 116-17 (1984). 
17. See Comment, supra note 15, at 653; Comment, supra note 16, at 116-17. 
18. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 124, at 873-74; Comment, supra note 15, at 
653. 
19. W. PROSSER, supra note 4; § 124, at 873-74. 
20. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 934 (5th ed. 1984). 
Although the common law expanded in that it permitted a husband to recover 
nonpecuniary damages in addition to pecuniary damages for tortious injury to 
his wife, see supra text accompanying note 19, it did not so expand in the 
father-child context. A father's recovery of damages for tortious injury to his. 
child was limited to pecuniary losses; the loss of his child's affection, society, 
and companionship was not actionable under the common law. W. PROSSER 
& W. KEETON, supra, § 125, at 934; Love, supra note 4, at 599-600. 
21. Love, supra note 4, at 599-600; see supra note 2. . 
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The enactment of Married Women's Acts,22 which began in the 
United States in the nineteenth century, gave wives legal identities 
apart from their husbands and generally provided married women 
with greater legal rights than they had had under the common law. 23 
Some courts responded to the enactment of the Married Women's 
Acts by refusing to recognize loss of a wife's consortium, on the 
basis that these acts eliminated a husband's legal entitlement to his 
wife's services, which meant that he suffered no legal damages as a 
result of an injury to her.24 The majority of courts, however, con-
tinued to recognize a husband's loss of his wife's consortium.25 
Although most jurisdictions continued to recognize the right of 
a husband to recover for loss of his wife's consortium, no jurisdiction 
during the first half of the twentieth century recognized a wife's 
right to sue for loss of her husband's consortium.26 Finally, in the 
1950 case of Hitajjer v. Argonne Co., Inc. ,27 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized a wife's 
right to sue for loss of her husband's consortium. The Hitajjer court 
based its holding on an equal protection rationale. 28 The court 
reasoned that because a husband was entitled to sue for the loss of 
his wife's consortium, equal protection required the converse to be 
permitted as well, although a wife had had no such cause of- action 
under the common law. 29 
Maryland initially rejected Hitajjer,30 but in 1967 the court of 
appeals held that a wife did have the right to sue for loss of her 
husband's consortium by bringing a joint action with her husbandY 
22. For a synopsis of Married Women's Acts by jurisdiction, see 3 C. VERNIER, 
AMERICAN FAMll.Y LAWS § 167 (1935). For commentary on the developments 
leading to the enactment of the Married Women's Acts, see R. Chused, Married 
Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983). 
23. See Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning oj Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 4 (1923). For example, the Married Women's Acts generally permitted 
married women to own property and to sue without the assistance of their 
husbands and also entitled married women to retain their own income. 1d. 
Married women did not have these rights under the common law. See id. 
24. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 125, at 891; Holbrook, supra note 23, at 6-8. 
25. See supra note 24. 
26. Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37,46, 113 A.2d 82, 86 (1955). 
27. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950). 
28. See 183 F.2d at 816 ("the husband and the wife have equal rights in the 
marriage relation which will receive equal protection of the law. "). 
29. See id. at 816-19. 
30. Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 45-51, 113 A.2d 82, 86-89 
(1955). For an early Maryland case which held that a wife had no cause of 
action for the loss of her husband's consortium, see Emerson v. Taylor, 133 
Md. 192, 104 A. 538 (1918). 
31. Deems v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 247 Md. 95, 115, 231 A.2d 514, 525 (1967). 
The court's holding also required a husband to bring a joint action with his 
wife for injury to the marital relationship in order to recover for loss of her 
consortium. [d. 
1990] Loss of Parental Consortium 605 
The court's decision was influenced by the possibility that equal 
protection was violated by existing Maryland law which permitted 
husbands, but not wives, to sue for loss of spousal consortium.32 
After the Hilaffer decision other jurisdictions also recognized a wife's 
right to sue for loss of her husband's consortium, at least in part to 
avoid violating equal protection.33 Most jurisdictions in the United 
States now recognize this cause of action.34 
There has recently been a line of cases which has recognized a 
child's loss of parental consortium as a cause of action.35 In the 1978 
decision of Berger v. Weber,36 Michigan's intermediate appellate court 
became the first appellate court which was not subsequently reversed 
to recognize this cause of action. In 1980 the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts became the first state court of last resort to rec-
ognize loss of parental consortium.37 The following year, the Supreme 
Court of Michigan affirmed the 1978 decision of Michigan's inter-
mediate appellate court,38 and Michigan became the second state in 
the country whose highest" court recognized the cause of action. Eight 
state supreme courts have expressly recognized loss of parental con-
sortium;39 however, most courts do not.40 
Courts which have recognized loss of parental consortium have 
stated a variety of reasons for doing so. First, these courts have 
viewed loss of parental consortium as analogous to other kinds of 
recognized consortium claims such as loss of spousal consortium,41 
loss of a child's consortium,42 and loss of parental consortium under 
32. The court stated that a "federal constitutional question" was presented. [d. at 
113, 231 A.2d at 524. This "federal constitutional question" was a reference 
to equal protection which the court had discussed earlier in its opinion. See 
id. at 101-07,231 A.2d at 517-21. The Deems court also stated that it adopted 
the joint action approach for legal and social policy reasons. [d. at 113, 231 
A.2d at 524. 
33. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 20, § 125, at 931-32; see Robinson v. 
Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 634 (Tenn. 1974) (Henry, J., concurring). 
34. Comment, Who Should Recover for Loss of Consortium?, 35 ME. L. REv. 
295 n.4 (1983) (44 states and the District of Columbia recognize a wife's right 
to recover for loss of her husband's consortium). 
35. See supra note 5. 
36. 82 Mich. App. 199, 267 N.W.2d 124 (1978), afi'd, 411 Mich. I, 303 N.W.2d 
424 (1981). 
37. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 
(1980). 
38. Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. I, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981), aff'g, 82 Mich. App. 
199, 267 N.W.2d 124 (1978). 
39. See supra note 5. 
40. See supra note 3. 
41. Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 994-95 (Alaska 1987). 
42. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 512-13, 413 N.E.2d 
690, 693-94 (1980); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 509, 334 
N.W.2d 513, 515-16 (1984). 
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a wrongful death statute.43 Second, these courts have recognized that 
children are now enjoying more legal rights and protections such as 
first amendment,44 due process,4S and equal protection rights.46 Third, 
some of these courts have held that their state's legislature has a 
policy of protecting children's interests and that this policy supports 
recognition of a child's right to recover for loss of parental consor-
tium.47 Finally, these courts have been concerned about the need to 
compensate children for the injury they undoubtedly sustain when 
they are deprived of parental consortium.48 
Courts which have rejected a cause of action for loss of parental 
consortium have generally done so based on tort law principles, 
public policy grounds, or both. One of the tort law principles used 
to justify rejection of the parental consortium claim is that tort law 
generally permits only a primary tort victim-the person who is 
directly injured by the tortfeasor-to recover damages, so a secondary 
tort victim-a person who is injured by the injury to the primary 
tort victim-is generally not permitted to recover against a tortfea-
sor.49 Another tort law principle used to reject the parental consortium 
claim is that a tortfeasor does not owe a duty to the injured parent's 
43. E.g., Ferriter, 381 Mass. at 515, 413 N.E.2d at 695; Berger v. Weber, 411 
Mich. 1, l3, 303 N.W.2d 424, 425 (1981). 
44. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 517, 344 N.W.2d at 517. 
45. Villareal v. State Dep't of Transp., 160 Ariz. 474, 478, 774 P.2d 213, 217 
(1989); Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 517, 344 N.W.2d at 517. 
46. Villareal, 160 Ariz. at 478,774 P.2d at 217; Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 517, 344 
N.W.2d at 517. 
47. Ferriter, 381 Mass. at 515-16, 413 N.E.2d at 695. 
48. E.g., Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 15, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1981) ("com-
pensating a child who has suffered emotional problems because of the depri-
vation of a parent's love and affection may provide the child with the means 
of adjustment to the loss"); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 
l31, 138, 691 P.2d 190, 194 (1984) (en bane) ("Allowing a child to recover 
for loss of consortium may aid in ensuring the child's continued normal and 
complete mental development into adulthood."); Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 523, 
344 N.W.2d at 520 ("Although a monetary award may be a poor substitute 
for the loss of a parent's society and companionship, it is the only workable 
way that our legal system has found to ease the injured party's tragic loss. "). 
49. Berger, 411 Mich. at 34, 303 N.W.2d at 435 (Levin, J., dissenting) ("There 
are few other instances [except for consortium c1aimsl where a secondary tort 
victim has been permitted to recover for a negligently inflicted injury to a 
relational interest unaccompanied by physical injury to himself.") (emphasis 
in original); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 293 Or. 543, 560-
61,652 P.2d 318,328 (1982) ("negligence alone, as a reason to shift the burden 
of a resulting loss, has not been deemed so grievous as to hold the negligent 
actor liable beyond the immediate victim's injury to others who suffer a loss 
only in consequence of that injury"). 
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child.50 One court which rejected the cause of action noted that tort 
law usually does not impose liability for psychic injuries that are not 
accompanied by a physical injury to the tort victimY 
A policy reason used to support rejection of the cause of action 
is the increased burden its recognition would place on the litigation 
system due to the added number of claims it would permit. 52 Courts 
have also expressed the need to place reasonable limits on a tortfea-
sor's liability as a reason to reject the cause of action.53 Another 
policy reason frequently used to support the denial of recognition of 
the parental consortium claim is that recognition of the cause of 
action would impose additional costs upon society through increased 
insurance premiums.54 Because of the expected increase in insurance 
premiums, some courts have also been concerned that marginal 
insureds would choose to be uninsured. 55 Some of these policy 
concerns were explained succinctly in Russell v. Salem Transportation 
Co., Inc.,56 where the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated: 
If the [parental consortium] claim were allowed there would 
be a substantial accretion of liability against the tortfeasor 
arising out of a single transaction (typically the negligent 
operation of an automobile). Whereas the assertion of a 
spouse's demand for loss of consortium involves the joining 
of only a single companion claim in the action with that of 
the injured person, the right here debated would entail 
adding as many companion claims as the injured parent had 
minor children, each such claim entitled to separate appraisal 
and award. The defendant's burden would be further en-
larged if. the claims were founded upon injuries to both 
parents. Magnification of damage awards to a single family 
derived from a single accident might well become a serious 
problem to a particular defendant as well as in terms of the 
total cost of such enhanced awards to the insured community 
as a wholeY 
50. DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical Center, 84 A.D.2d 17, 22-23, 445 N.Y.S.2d 
188, 193 (1981), a//'d mem., 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 449 N.E.2d 406, 462 N.Y.S.2d 
626 (1983). 
51. Norwest, 293 Or. at 548, 652 P.2d at 321. 
52. See Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982). 
53. Lewis v. Rowland, 287 Ark. 474, 478, 701 S.W.2d 122, 124 (1985); Russell v. 
Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 507, 295 A.2d 862, 864 (1972). 
54. E.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 447, 563 P.2d 858, 
862, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306 (1977); Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 741. 
55. See Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 447,563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306; DeAngelis, 
84 A.D.2d at 24, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 193-94. 
56. 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972). 
57. [d. at 506, 295 A.2d at 864. 
608 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 19 
Other reasons courts have used to support their rejection of 
parental consortium claims include: the decision to adopt the cause 
of action should be left to the legislature,58 remoteness and uncertainty 
of damages are inherent in the cause of action, 59 the number of 
actions that could arise from a single tort could multiply, 60 and the 
possibility that an injured parent and a child would receive a double 
recovery.61 Courts have also been skeptical about the ability of money 
damages to compensate children for consortium losses62 and have 
rejected the argument that the failure to recognize parental consor-
tium violates equal protection.63 Finally, courts have also rejected 
58. E.g., Lewis v. Roland, 287 Ark. 474, 477, 701 S.W.2d 122, 124 (1985); Zorzos 
v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1985); Morgel v. Winger, 290 N.W.2d 
266, 267 (N.D. 1980); Steiner v. Bell Tel. Co., 358 Pa. Super. 505, 515, 517 
A.2d 1348, 1356 (1986), aff'd per curiam, 518 Pa. 57, 540 A.2d 266 (1988). 
But see Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982) (rejecting the 
cause of action but stating that it is not proper to defer the matter to the 
legislature) . 
59. Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 167, 368 P.2d 57, 58 (1962); Russell v. 
Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 507, 295 A.2d 862, 864. 
60. Hoffman, 189 Kan. at 169, 368 P.2d at 58-59; Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 740. 
61. Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D. Neb. 1980); 
Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 740. Both Hoesing and Salin state that the difficulty in 
determining the child's damages is what can lead to a double recovery. Hoesing, 
484 F. Supp. at 480; Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 740. But see Steiner, 358 Pa. Super. 
at 517, 517 A.2d at 1354 (court rejects the parental consortium cause of action 
but states that double recovery can be prevented by careful jury instructions), 
aff'd per curiam, 518 Pa. 57, 540 A.2d 266 (1988). 
62. See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. 
Rptr. 302 (1977) where the Supreme Court of California expressed this skep-
ticism as follows: 
Loss of consortium is an intangible, nonpecuniary loss; monetary 
compensation will not enable plaintiffs to regain the companionship 
and guidance of a mother; it will simply establish a fund so that upon 
reaching adulthood, when plaintiffs will be less in need of maternal 
guidance, they will be unusually wealthy men and women. 
Id. at 447, 563 P .2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306. 
63. Two arguments have been advanced to assert that rejection of the cause of 
action violates equal protection. One argument is that equal protection is 
violated when minor children are permitted to recover damages under a 
wrongful death statute for the death of a parent but not when a parent has 
survived an injury. This argument has been rejected on the ground that under 
the state's wrongful death statute, the surviving spouse and next of kin can 
recover damages. Therefore, minor children are not a distinct category of 
parties to be compensated under the wrongful death statute. Salin, 322 N.W.2d 
at 742; Russell, 61 N.J. at 507-08, 295 A.2d at 865. The same equal protection 
argument has also been rejected on the ground that surviving children who are 
entitled to damages under a wrongful death statute are permanently deprived 
of parental consortium, which generally is not the case when the parent survives. 
Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 742; Russell, 61 N.J. at 508, 295 A.2d at 865; Steiner, 
358 Pa. Super. at 518, 517 A.2d at 1355; cf. Norwest v. Presbyterian Inter-
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attempts to analogize parental consortium to other consortium claims.64 
The courts which have recognized the cause of action have 
criticized some of the reasons used by the majority view to reject 
the cause of action. For example, the courts adopting the cause of 
action have rejected the view that recognition of the cause of action 
is a legislative matter, because recognition of lost consortium is a 
judicially created doctrine which can be modified without legislative 
approval.6S The courts adopting the cause of action have rejected 
concerns raised about the remoteness and uncertainty of damages 
inherent in the cause of action because these same difficulties are 
tolerated by courts when they recognize other kinds of consortium 
claims or other claims involving intangible injuries.66 As to the 
problems of increased insurance and societal costs which have been 
used as reasons to reject the cause of action, these courts have stated 
that compensating a child who has been deprived of parental con-
sortium may offset an increase in costs to society resulting from 
recognition of the cause of actionY Finally, the courts adopting the 
cause of action have stated that the problem of the parent and child 
being awarded a double recovery can be solved by giving proper jury 
instructions,68 and that the potential problem of multiplicity of actions 
community Hosp., 293 Or. 543, 568, 652 P.2d 318, 332 (1982) (the distinction 
between a surviving child who is compensated under a wrongful death statute 
and a child whose parent is injured but survives "is not among kinds of 
children but between the scope of defendants' liability for causing fatal as 
distinct from nonfatal injuries to the immediate victims of their negligence"). 
The second kind of equal protection argument which has been made to 
urge adoption of the cause of action is that equal protection is violated when 
spousal consortium is recognized and parental consortium is not. This argument 
has been rejected on the ground that the spousal relationship and the parent-
child relationship are not comparable. Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 742; Steiner, 358 
Pa. Super. at 518, 517 A.2d at 1355. 
The courts which have recognized parental consortium have not stated 
that equal protection requires it to be recognized. See supra note 5. 
64. E.g., Zorzos v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1985) (the legislature's decision 
to recognize loss of parental consortium in wrongful death cases coupled with 
its failure to recognize it in nonwrongful death cases indicates the legislature 
deliberately decided not to recognize parental consortium in nonwrongful death 
cases); Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 739-40 (1oss of spousal consortium is distinct 
from loss of parental consortium because the former is based in part on the 
loss of sexual relations and the opportunity to bear children while the latter is 
not). 
65. E.g., Hay v. Medical Center Hosp., 145 Vt. 533, 536-37, 496 A.2d 939, 941 
(1985); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 136, 691 P.2d 190, 
193 (1984) (en banc). 
66. See, e.g., Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. I, 15-16,303 N.W.2d 424, 426-27 (1981); 
Hay, 145 Vt. at 540-41, 496 A.2d at 943-44. 
67. E.g., Berger, 411 Mich. at 15, 303 N.W.2d at 426; Ueland, 103 Wash. 2d at 
140, 691 P .2d at 195. 
68. Ueland, 103 Wash. 2d at 139, 691 P.2d at 194-95; c/. Berger, 411 Mich. at 17, 
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can be solved by requiring joinder of the child's and parent's claims.69 
In assessing the loss of parental consortium claim in Gaver v. 
Harrant,7° the court noted that this cause of action had never been 
recognized by Maryland common law. 71 The court stated that adop-
tion of a new cause of action raised public policy concerns72 and 
that the declaration of Maryland's public policy is usually a legislative 
function. 73 On the other hand, the court also acknowledged that 
Maryland's common law is "'subject to judicial modification in light 
of modern circumstances or increased knowledge" '74 and that stare 
decisis does not prevent the court from changing or modifying 
Maryland common law when the court finds "'in light of changed 
conditions or increased knowledge, that the [common law] rule has 
become unsound in the circumstances of modern life, a vestige of 
the past, no longer suitable to our people." '75 It was against this test 
that the court considered the arguments for and against adoption of 
loss of parental consortium as a cause of action. 
The court in Gaver relied primarily on a combination of tort 
law and public policy reasons to justify application of stare decisis 
and thus rejected recognition of loss of parental consortium. As to 
the tort law reasons, the court viewed parental consortium with 
disfavor because a child who has been tortiously deprived of parental 
consortium is a secondary tort victim as opposed to a primary tort 
victim.76 Because the child is a secondary tort victim with only 
intangible injuries, the court reasoned that the uncertainty and re-
moteness of damages inherent in the parental consortium claim was 
"a more important factor"77 in determining whether the cause of 
action should be recognized. 78 The policy reasons the court relied on 
to reject the cause of action were the expansion of tort feasor liability 
and the increased societal costs that recognition of the cause of action 
would impose,79 coupled with the practical consideration of the 
inability of money damages to remedy loss of parental consortium.80 
303 N.W.2d at 427 (because juries take into account the loss suffered by the 
children in determining an award to the parent, a separate cause of action for 
the children would eliminate the potential for a double recovery by the parent). 
69. Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 997 (Alaska 1987); 
Ueland, 103 Wash. 2d at 136-37, 691 P.2d at 193-94. 
70. 316 Md. 17, 557 A.2d 210 (1989). 
71. [d. at 27, 557 A.2d at 216. 
72. [d. at 28, 557 A.2d at 216. 
73. [d. at 28-29, 557 A.2d at 216. 
74. [d. at 27-28, 557 A.2d at 216 (quoting Ireland v. State, 310 Md. 328, 331, 529 
A.2d 365, 366 (1987». 
75. [d. at 28, 557 A.2d at 216 (quoting Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of 
Educ., 295 Md. 442, 459, 456 A.2d 894, 903 (1983». 
76. [d. at 30, 557 A.2d at 217. 
77. [d. 
78. [d. 
79. [d. at 31, 557 A.2d at 217-18. 
80. [d. at 30, 557 A.2d at 217. 
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The court also rejected arguments that the cause of action was 
analogous to spousal consortium81 or to loss of parental consortium 
under Maryland's wrongful death statute.82 
Although the court in Gaver recognized that children sustain a 
loss when they are deprived of parental consortium,83 it concluded 
"that adoption of the proposed cause of action is not compelled by 
changing circumstances nor by a pressing societal need. The existing 
rule has not 'become unsound in the circumstances of modern life."'84 
Thus, the court declined to recognize the cause of action and stated 
that any change in the law should be made by the legislature.85 
Judge Adkins dissented because he believed that adoption of the 
cause of action was consistent with the legislature's policy of pro-
tecting children and preserving the family unit. 86 In addition, the 
81. Id. at 31, 557 A.2d at 218. The court cited differences between the child-
parent relationship and the husband-wife relationship to distinguish parental 
from spousal consortium. Id. The court also noted that in Maryland the spousal 
consortium claim does not belong to either spouse individually but that it 
belongs to the marital entity. Id. (citing Deems v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 247 
Md. 95, 108-15, 231 A.2d 514, 523-25 (1967». 
82. Gaver, 316 Md. at 32-33, 557 A.2d at 218. Maryland's wrongful death statute 
permits a minor child to recover "damages for mental anguish, emotional pain 
and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection ... parental 
care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, guidance, or education 
where applicable." MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904(d)(1989). The 
court distinguished claims for loss of parental consortium in nonfatal cases 
from loss of parental consortium claims actionable under wrongful death 
statutes by stating that the claims under wrongful death statutes were created 
legislatively, not judicially. Gaver, 316 Md. at 32-33, 557 A.2d at 218 (citing 
Zorzos v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1985». Furthermore, the court stated 
that policy reasons support recognition of loss of parental consortium in 
wrongful death cases because the failure to recognize such claims along with 
the application of the pecuniary loss rule "could result in no recovery at all if 
the victim was an unproductive member of society, very old or young, or 
disabled." Id. at 32-33, 557 A.2d at.218. 
83. Gaver, 316 Md. at 33, 557 A.2d at 218. 
84. Id. (quoting Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 
459, 456 A.2d 894, 903 (1983». 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 33, 557 A.2d at 219 (Adkins, J., dissenting). The dissent cited the 
following Maryland statutes to demonstrate that Maryland's legislature has 
such a policy: MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-401 (1984) (legislature's policy 
is to "promote family stability, to preserve family unity, and to help families 
achieve and maintain self reliance."); id. § 5-203(b)(1) (1984) (parents are 
responsible for the "support, care, nurture, welfare, and education" of their 
children); id. § 5-313(a) (Supp. 1988) (best interests of the child governs whether 
custody rights of natural parents may be terminated); id. § 5-502 (1984) 
(Maryland's public policy is to protect foster children); id. §§ 5-701 to -715 
(Supp. 1988) (protects children from abuse and neglect); id. § 5-801 (Supp. 
1988) (provides criminal sanctions for leaving children unattended); id. § 5-
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dissent asserted that it was anomalous to permit a child to recover 
for the loss of a deceased parent's consortium under the wrongful 
death statute and to recognize loss of spousal consortium, and yet 
reject the proposed cause of action.87 The dissent also contended that 
permitting a child to recover consortium damages would help the 
child adjust to his or her injury, which would in turn benefit society.88 
The holding in Gaver was justified, and the court's rationale 
was generally well-reasoned as to both the tort law concerns and the 
public policy concerns presented by the proposed cause of action. 
The court correctly viewed loss of parental consortium with disfavor 
because tort law disfavors compensating parties who are not directly 
injured by a tortfeasor's conduct.89 While legal recognition of loss 
of spousal consortium is an exception to this rule, spousal consortium 
claims are necessarily limited to two people, whereas loss of parental 
consortium claims could interject a significantly larger number of 
plaintiffs into a case, depending on the number of children in the 
primary tort victim's family.90 Therefore, the majority's concern 
about the expansion of tortfeasor liability and the corresponding 
increased societal costs that would accompany adoption of the cause 
of action91 was justified. This in turn justified the court's holding 
that the common law rule which did not recognize the cause of 
action was not unsound and that consequently, a change to this rule 
should be made only by the legislature. 92 
The dissenting opinion was not persuasive for several reasons. 
In attempting to establish that the cause of action should be recog-
nized because of the legislature's policy of protecting children and 
preserving the family unit, the dissent relied on authority inapposite 
to the case under review. While the dissent was correct that Maryland 
does have such a public policy, most of the authorities relied on by 
the dissent to demonstrate that this policy exists were based primarily 
on family law, not tort law.93 Thus, the dissent used family law 
l002(b)(2) (1984) (children born out of wedlock have the same rights as children 
not born out of wedlock); id. § 9-202(a) (1984) (guidelines for resolving custody 
disputes attempt to protect the best interests of children); MD. CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904(d) (1984 & Supp. 1988) (children have a cause of 
action for lost parental consortium in the case of a wrongful death of a parent). 
316 Md. at 38-45, 557 A.2d at 221-24. 
87. Gaver, 316 Md. at 43, 557 A.2d at 223-24 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
88. Id. at 45-46,557 A.2d at 225 (Adkins, J., dissenting) (quoting Berger v. Weber, 
411 Mich. 1, 15, 303 N.W.2d 424,.426 (1981». 
89. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra text accompanying note 57; see, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, 
Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 449, 563 P.2d 858, 863-64, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 307-08 
(1977) (injured parent had nine children). 
91. Gaver, 316 Md. at 31, 557 A.2d at 217. 
92. See id. at 33, 557 A.2d at 218. 
93. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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principles to justify the adoption of a new tort which possessed 
characteristics disfavored by tort law. 94 
The dissent's analogy to spousal consortium was not persuasive 
because spousal consortium and parental consortium involve two very 
dissimilar relationships - the husband~wife relationship, and the 
parent~child relationship, respectively. The type of consortium claim 
most analogous to loss of parental consortium is loss of a child's 
consortium, because both of those claims involve the parent~child 
relationship. Since Maryland law does not recognize loss of a child's 
consortium in nonfatal cases,9S reasoning by analogy to Maryland's 
existing consortium law would actually support the majority's view 
rather than the view of the dissent. The dissent's analogy to loss of 
parental consortium under the wrongful death statute was not com~ 
pelling either, because a child's loss of a fatally injured parent's 
consortium is always total and permanent, which is not necessarily 
so when a parent is not fatally injured.96 The dissent also failed to 
consider that legal recognition of a husband's loss of his wife's 
consortium is based on an anachronism97 and that the recent expan~ 
sion of spousal consortium in Maryland and elsewhere which now 
permits wives to recover for loss of their husband's consortium98 was 
in part a result of equal protection requirements.99 By contrast, equal 
protection does not require legal recognition of loss of parental 
consortium. 100 
94. See supra note 49 and accompanying text stating that tort law generally does 
not permit a secondary tort victim to recover damages; supra text accompanying 
notes 76-78. 
95. See infra note 96. The dissent erroneously believed that Maryland law recognizes 
loss of a child's consortium. See id. 
96. The dissent also cited Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961); 
Seglinski v. Baltimore Copper Co., 149 Md. 541, 131 A. 774 (1926); Hussey 
v. Ryan, 64 Md. 426, 2 A. 729 (1886); County Comm'rs v. Hamilton, 60 Md. 
340 (1883); and MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 5-205 to -206 (1984), for the 
proposition that Maryland allows "a parent ... to recover for loss of a minor 
child's services, society, etc." 316 Md. at 37, 557 A.2d at 221 (emphasis added). 
The dissent was mistaken in part because Hudson, Seglinski, Hussey, and 
Hamilton recognized the right of a parent to recover damages for medical 
expenses or loss of a child's services; they did not recognize that a parent 
could recover for nonpecuniary damages such as loss of a child's society. The 
common law generally did not permit a parent to recover damages for loss of 
a child's society. See supra note 20. Furthermore, §§ 5-205 to 206 permit a 
parent to recover damages for a child's lost services and earnings; they do not 
permit a parent to recover for loss of a child's society. 
97. See supra note 2; supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text discussing the 
proprietary interest a husband had in his wife's services, affection, and com-
panionship at common law. 
98. See supra notes 14-34 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text. 
100. Note, Recovery for Loss of Parental Consortium, supra note 4, at 296-97; see 
supra note 63 and accompanying text. But see Love, supra note 4, at 606-07. 
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In addition to rejecting loss of parental consortium as a cause 
of action in Maryland, the decision in Gaver clearly indicates that 
in the foreseeable future, the court of appeals will view with disfavor 
proposals for the court to adopt other kinds of consortium claims 
which have not been previously recognized in Maryland. 1ol 
In Gaver v. Harron!, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that children do not have a cause of action for loss of parental 
consortium when a parent survives a tortious injury. The court 
rejected the cause of action largely because recognition of it would 
result in the expansion of tortfeasor liability and increased societal 
costs and because a consortium claim is for intangible harm sustained 
by a party who is not the primary victim of a tort. As a result of 
the decision in Gaver, Maryland has joined the majority of jurisdic-
tions which refuse to recognize loss of parental consortium. 
James E. Myers 
101. An example of such a consortium claim is a parent's loss of a child's consortium 
which is not recognized in Maryland, see supra note 95 and accompanying 
text, but is recognized in some jurisdictions. E.g., Reben v. Ely, 146 Ariz. 
309, 705 P.2d 1360 (1985); Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 
495 (1975). Another potential consortium claim which is unlikely to be recog-
nized in Maryland in light of Gaver is loss of an unmarried cohabitant's 
consortium which some commentators have suggested should be recognized. 
See Comment, Iowa Cohabitants Denied Recovery Jor Loss oj Consortium, 69 
IOWA L. REv. 811 (1984); Comment, Loss oj Consortium: Extending the Cause 
oj Action to Cohabitators in Hawaii, 10 U. HAW. L. REv. 291 (1988); Note, 
Expanding Loss oj Consortium in Vermont: Developing a New Doctrine, 12 
VT. L. REv. 157, 170-80 (1987). 
